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I. INTRODUCTION
The fifth amendment to the United States Constitution guar-
antees to all persons the privilege against compelled self-incrimina-
tion.1 In Miranda v. Arizona,2 the United States Supreme Court
1. U.S. CONST. amend. V. The fifth amendment states: "No person.., shall be com-
pelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself ... " Id.
2. 384 U.S. 436 (1966). In Miranda the police arrested the defendant and took him
to a special interrogation room where the defendant gave his confession. The police, how-
ever, failed to provide the defendant with a full warning of his constitutional right to con-
1159
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interpreted the fifth amendment to require a specified set of proce-
dural safeguards that law enforcement officers must follow to pro-
tect adequately each individual's fifth amendment rights. The Mi-
randa safeguards require that prior to an accused's custodial
interrogation,3 government officials must inform the accused that
he has the right to remain silent; that any of his statements may
be used against him in a subsequent criminal action; that he has
the right to confer with counsel; and that if he cannot afford to
hire counsel, the court will appoint an attorney to represent him."
The government may not use a confession obtained in violation of
these Miranda safeguards to prove the guilt of a defendant.5
An accused's right to counsel at pretrial criminal proceedings
protects that individual from providing a compelled or involuntary
confession.6 The right to counsel ensures that the government af-
fords assistance to an accused in dealing with the criminal process
7
and also protects an accused from inadvertent self-incrimination.8
An accused's right to have an attorney present during any ques-
tioning is absolute.9 Courts must exclude any statement given by
an accused during custodial interrogation unless the interrogating
officers advise the accused, prior to questioning, of his right to
have counsel present during questioning, and the accused volunta-
rily, knowingly, and intelligently waives this right.10 Furthermore,
Miranda holds that if an accused "indicates in any manner and at
any stage of the process that he wishes to consult with an attorney
sult with an attorney and to have one present during questioning. Id. at 491.
3. For the question of what constitutes custody, see infra note 41 and accompanying
text. See generally Kamisar, "Custodial Interrogation" Within the Meaning of Miranda, in
CRIMINAL LAW AND THE CONSTITUTION-SouRCES AND COMMENTARIES 335, 338-51 (1966);
Smith, The Threshold Question in Applying Miranda: What Constitutes Custodial Interro-
gation?, 25 S.C.L. REv. 699 (1974).
4. 384 U.S. at 444, 479.
5. Id. at 479. But see infra notes 58-62 and accompanying text (detailing limited
ways that a statement taken in violation of Miranda may be used).
6. See W. RINGEL, SEARCHES & SzizuREs, ARRESTS AND CONFESSIONS § 24.3, at 2-7
(rev. 2d ed. 1982).
7. See Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454, 469-70 (1981); Von Moltke v. Gillies, 332 U.S.
708, 721-22 (1948).
8. See Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 719 (1979).
9. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 472 (1966).
10. Id. at 479. But see New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649 (1984) (recognizing a public
safety exception to the Miranda requirements); see also Gardner, The Emerging Good
Faith Exception to the Miranda Rule-A Critique, 35 HASTINGS L.J. 429 (1984) (exploring a
possible exception to the exclusionary rule when the interrogating officers act in good faith
compliance with Miranda).
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before speaking there can be no questioning."" Thus, even if an
accused initially waives his right and agrees to speak with law en-
forcement officials, he may cease the questioning at any time by
invoking his right to counsel. When an accused invokes his consti-
tutional right to counsel, he also effectively exercises his right to
remain silent, thus requiring the interrogation to cease until the
government affords him the opportunity to confer with an
attorney. 2
This Note focuses on determining when an accused has in-
voked his right to counsel. Because Miranda's "in any manner"
language does not indicate what degree of clarity is required for a
defendant to invoke his right to counsel, the judiciary has strug-
gled to create a standard to determine when an accused's equivocal
reference to an attorney constitutes an invocation of the right to
counsel. The Supreme Court has not addressed specifically the is-
sue of whether an equivocal reference to an attorney is an invoca-
tion of the right to counsel.'3 Recently, in Smith v. Illinois14 the
Supreme Court explicitly declined to resolve the issue of equivocal
references to an attorney.15 Thus, the conflicting standards 6 for
determining the consequences of an ambiguous reference to coun-
sel remain among the various courts.
In addressing whether an accused has invoked his right to
counsel by making an equivocal reference to an attorney, courts
have developed three different approaches. The first approach re-
11. 384 U.S. at 444-45.
12. See Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 484-85 (1981). Once an accused has in-
voked the right to counsel, he is not subject to further interrogation by the authorities until
counsel has been made available to him or unless the accused himself initiates further com-
munications, exchanges, or conversations with the police. Id. at 485.
13. The Supreme Court has held that certain actions and statements do not consti-
tute an invocation of counsel. See Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707 (1979) (holding that the
defendant's request for his probation officer is not a request for counsel).
14. 105 S. Ct. 490 (1984). In Smith v. Illinois the Supreme Court found that the
defendant's initial request for counsel was unambiguous and, therefore, declined to resolve
the conflicting approaches developed by the lower courts for determining whether an ac-
cused's equivocal references to an attorney constitute an invocation of the right to counsel.
The Court's limited holding stated that once an accused clearly invokes his right to counsel,
courts may not use the accused's subsequent ambiguous remarks concerning his desire for
an attorney to cast doubt on the accused's initial request for counsel. Id. at 495; see infra
notes 91-95 and accompanying text (discussing Smith v. Illinois).
15. 105 S. Ct. at 493, 495. The Court currently is faced with the opportunity to de-
cide this issue. See Connecticut v. Barrett, 197 Conn. 50, 495 A.2d 1044, cert. granted, 54
U.S.L.W. 3761 (May 19, 1986).
16. The Court spelled out the various conflicting standards in a footnote. Id. at 493
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quires that an accused's reference to an attorney reach a threshold
standard of clarity before the accused's statements constitute an
invocation of the right to counsel. 17 References too ambiguous to
meet this threshold do not invoke the right to counsel. Courts ad-
hering to the second approach hold that upon any reference to
counsel by the accused, all interrogation must cease immediately
and there may be no further interrogation until counsel is pre-
sent.'8 Finally, the third approach requires that when an accused
makes an equivocal reference to an attorney, the interrogating offi-
cials must immediately limit their questioning to a clarification of
the accused's desires concerning counsel. 9 Officials may continue
the interrogation only if the officials determine that the accused
does not wish to invoke his right to counsel.
The purpose of this Note is to determine which approach best
effectuates the proper balance between preserving an individual's
constitutional rights and promoting the need of law enforcement
officials to pursue legitimate criminal prosecutions in an effective
manner. Part II examines the history of the right against com-
pelled self-incrimination, particularly judicial interpretations of
the right to counsel. Part III discusses the leading cases that apply
the three different approaches courts have taken in determining
when an accused has invoked the right to counsel. Part IV analyzes
these approaches in light of other judicial precedent, everyday ap-
plication of custodial interrogation procedures, and the need for
stringent protection of each individual's constitutional rights. Part
17. See, e.g., State v. Johnson, 318 N.W.2d 417 (Iowa 1982); People v. Kendricks, 121
Ill. App. 3d 442, 462 N.E.2d 1256 (1984); People v. Harper, 94 Inl. App. 3d 298, 418 N.E.2d
894 (1981); People v. Krueger, 82 Ill. 2d 305, 412 N.E.2d 537 (1980); see also People v.
Bestelmeyer, 166 Cal. App. 3d 520, 212 Cal. Rptr. 605 (1985); Bautista v. State, 632 S.W.2d
846 (Tex. Crim. App. 1982); Tanner v. State, 690 S.W.2d 96 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985); see also
Palmer v. Wainwright, 725 F.2d 1511 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 227 (1984).
18. See, e.g., People v. Duran, 140 Cal. App. 3d 485, 189 Cal. Rptr. 595, cert. denied,
464 U.S. 991 (1983); People v. Russo, 148 Cal. App. 3d 1172, 196 Cal. Rptr. 466 (1983); U.S.
v. Lilla, 534 F. Supp. 1247 (N.D.N.Y. 1982); People v. Traubert, 199 Colo. 322, 608 P.2d 342
(1980); Hunt v. State, 632 S.W.2d 640 (Tex. Crim. App. 1982); Wentela v. State, 95 Wis. 2d
283, 290 N.W.2d 312 (1980); White v. Finkbeiner, 611 F.2d 186 (7th Cir. 1979); State v.
Blakney, 605 P.2d 1093 (Mont. 1979); State v. Nash, 119 N.H. 728, 407 A.2d 365 (1979);
Ochoa v. State, 573 S.W.2d 796 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978); People v. Superior Court, 15 Cal. 3d
729, 542 P.2d 1390, 125 Cal. Rptr. 798 (1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 816 (1976); U.S. v.
Clark, 499 F.2d 802 (4th Cir. 1974); State v. Ayers, 16 Or. App. 300, 518 P.2d 190 (1974).
19. See, e.g., Nash v. Estelle, 597 F.2d 513 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 981
(1979); Thompson v. Wainwright, 601 F.2d 768 (5th Cir. 1979); United States v. Cherry, 733
F.2d 1124 (5th Cir. 1984); United States v. Porter, 764 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1985); Cannady v.
State, 427 So. 2d 723 (Fla. 1983); State v. Acquin, 187 Conn. 647, 448 A.2d 163 (1982), cert.
denied, 463 U.S. 1229 (1983); State v. Moulds, 105 Idaho 880, 673 P.2d 1074 (1983).
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V concludes that the proper standard for determining when an ac-
cused has invoked his right to counsel is an approach that limits
questioning of an accused to a clarification of the accused's desire
for an attorney following any reference to an attorney that conceiv-
ably could be considered as a request for counsel.
II. DEVELOPMENT OF THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL DURING CUSTODIAL
INTERROGATION
The fifth amendment"0 incorporated the common law privilege
against self-incrimination 21 into the Constitution of the United
States. Prior to the landmark case of Miranda v. Arizona,22 how-
ever, courts used the due process clause of the fourteenth amend-
ment to determine whether an accused's confession23 should be ad-
mitted into evidence. 24 As the standard for admissibility, courts
considered whether the confession was "voluntary." 25 Courts deter-
mined "voluntariness" by inquiring into the "totality of the cir-
cumstances" surrounding the interrogation.2 Although courts al-
20. U.S. CONST. amend. V; see supra note 1; see also L. LEVY, ORIGINS OF THE FIFTH
AMENDMENT: THE RIGHT AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION 426-27 (1968); Pittman, The Colonial
and Constitutional History of the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination in America, 21 VA.
L. REV. 763 (1935). In 1964 the Supreme Court made the privilege against self-incrimination
binding on the states by incorporating the privilege into the due process clause of the four-
teenth amendment. Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964).
21. The privilege against self-incrimination originated in England with the four-
teenth century statute Prohibitio formata de Statuto Articuli Cleri and the sixteenth cen-
tury oath ex officio mero. See generally Levy, The Right Against Self-Incrimination: His-
tory and Judicial History, 84 POL. SC. Q. 1 (1969) (tracing the development of the right
against compelled self-incrimination); Horowitz, The Privilege Against Self-Incrimina-
tion-How Did It Originate?, 31 TEMP. L.Q. 121 (1958) (same); 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §
2250 (J. McNaughton 2d ed. 1961) (same).
22. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
23. Congress has described a "confession" as "any confession of guilt of any criminal
offense or any self-incriminating statement made or given orally or in writing." 18 U.S.C.
§ 3501(e) (1982).
24. See, e.g., Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315 (1959) (holding that flagrant use of
deception to obtain confession violated accused's due process rights); Ashcraft v. Tennessee,
322 U.S. 143 (1944) (holding that 36 hour marathon interrogation produced nonvoluntary
confession and, thus, confession was inadmissible at trial); Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S.
278 (1936) (holding that use of police brutality to force confession violated accused's due
process rights). See generally 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2266 (J. McNaughton rev. ed.
1961).
25. See Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568 (1961).
26. The Court first developed the "totality of the circumstances" test in Johnson v.
Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938). In Johnson, a sixth amendment right to counsel case, the Court
stated that "[tihe determination of whether there has been an intelligent waiver of the right
to counsel must depend, in each case, upon the particular facts and circumstances surround-
ing that case." Id. at 464. For examples of the Court's application of the "totality of the
circumstances" test, see Columbe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568 (1961); Reck v. Pate, 367 U.S.
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ways excluded coerced confessions,27 regardless of the reliability of
the confession, the government satisfied due process requirements
by showing that the confession was the "product of an essentially
free and unconstrained choice by its maker. '2 8 The Supreme
Court, however, never articulated a clear and predictable definition
of "voluntariness. '29 The lack of a precise standard created diffi-
culties for courts attempting to apply the totality of the circum-
stances test.30
Massiah v. United States"1 and Escobedo v. Illinois3 2 heralded
a change of direction, from a fourteenth amendment due process
analysis to a sixth amendment right to counsel analysis, in the Su-
preme Court's handling of confession cases. In Massiah the Court
held that the sixth amendment 3 barred the admission of the ac-
cused's incriminating statements when law enforcement officials, in
the absence of counsel for the accused, deliberately and surrepti-
tiously elicited the statements after the accused's indictment.3 In
Escobedo the Court held that the sixth amendment prohibited the
use, at trial, of a preindictment incriminating statement that law
enforcement officials deliberately had elicited during custodial in-
terrogation after denying the accused's request to confer with an
attorney.3 5 The Supreme Court in Escobedo indicated that the
sixth amendment right to counsel attaches "when the process
shifts from investigatory to accusatory-when its focus is on the
accused, and its purpose is to elicit a confession."36 Just as courts
433 (1961).
27. Courts have viewed coerced confessions as "revolting to the sense of justice."
Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278, 286 (1936).
28. Culombe, 367 U.S. at 602.
29. Stone, The Miranda Doctrine in the Burger Court, 1977 SuP. CT. REV. 99, 102-
103.
30. Id. These difficulties included state courts' apparent persistence in using the am-
biguity of the concept to validate confessions of doubtful constitutionality and an increased
burden on the Supreme Court's workload. Id.
31. 377 U.S. 201 (1964).
32. 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
33. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. The sixth amendment states in pertinent part: "In all
criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to. .. have the Assistance of Coun-
sel for his defense." Id.
34. 377 U.S. at 206. At the arraignment, Massiah pleaded not guilty to charges of
federal narcotics violations. After his release on ball, the police secretly recorded an incrimi-
nating conversation between Massiah and a co-defendant through a listening device planted
on the co-defendant. Id. at 202-03.
35. Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 480-83 (1964). After being arrested and taken
to a police station for interrogation, the defendant asked to see his lawyer. The police falsely
stated that his lawyer did not want to see him. Id. at 481.
36. Id. at 492. The Court held:
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had found a fourteenth amendment analysis unsatisfactory for
handling confession cases, courts also concluded that a sixth
amendment analysis was unsatisfactory in confession cases because
the Escobedo "focus test" was unclear and, therefore, difficult to
apply.
3 7
Instead of clarifying Escobedo's sixth amendment "focus test,"
the Supreme Court in Miranda v. Arizonasa injected the fifth
amendment privilege against self-incrimination into confession
case analysis.3 9 One of the primary goals of the Miranda Court was
to provide clear constitutional guidelines to which both law en-
forcement officers and courts could easily adhere. With this goal in
mind, the Court sought to establish procedural safeguards outlin-
ing the admissibility of confessions under the fifth amendment.40
The Miranda holding rested on the premise that custodial in-
terrogation 41 is inherently coercive. 2 The Court, therefore, held
[W]here ... the investigation is no longer a general inquiry into an unsolved
crime but has begun to focus on a particular suspect, the suspect has been taken into
police custody, the police carry out a process of interrogations that lends itself to elicit-
ing incriminating statements, the suspect has requested and been denied an opportu-
nity to consult with his lawyer, and the police have not effectively warned him of his
absolute constitutional right to remain silent, the accused has been denied 'the Assis-
tance of Counsel' in violation of the Sixth Amendment ....
Id. at 490-91.
37. Both federal and state courts struggled with deciding what interpretation should
be applied to Escobedo's "focus test." See Warden, Miranda-Some History, Some Obser-
vations, and Some Questions, 20 VAND. L. REv. 39, 45-46 (1966) (listing various conflicts
among courts over interpretation to be given Escobedo); Spring, The Nebulous Nexus: Es-
cobedo, Miranda and the New 5th Amendment, 6 WASHBURN L.J. 428, 428-32 (1967) (argu-
ing in part that the purpose of Miranda was to correct the inadequacies of Escobedo); see
also Miranda, 384 U.S. at 440 n.2 (listing the scholarly debates regarding the ramifications
of the Escobedo decision).
38. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
39. Since Miranda, the Supreme Court has continued to reject Escobedo's focus test
and has confined the sixth amendment's right to counsel protection to cases in which the
government has initiated adversarial judicial proceedings against the accused, "'whether by
way of formal charge, preliminary hearing, indictment, information, or arraignment.'"
Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 398 (1977) (quoting Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 689
(1972)); see also Moore v. Illinois, 434 U.S. 220 (1977); United States v. Ash, 413 U.S. 300
(1973). One commentator has criticized this limitation on the sixth amendment as overly
formalistic. See White, Rhode Island v. Innis: The Significance of a Suspect's Assertion of
His Right to Counsel, 17 AM. CRIM. L. Rav. 53 (1979). Thus, although Massiah is still good
law, the fifth amendment is the accused's primary source of protection during custodial in-
terrogation because defense attorneys normally will be present during any custodial interro-
gation occurring after the initiation of adversarial judicial proceedings.
40. 384 U.S. at 439-42.
41. In Miranda the Court defined custodial interrogation as "questioning initiated by
law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of
his freedom of action in any significant way." Id. at 444. Because the Miranda safeguards
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that the government may not use incriminating evidence 43 elicited
from the accused during custodial interrogation unless the govern-
ment can show that it complied with specific procedural safeguards
designed to assure the accused's privilege against compulsory self-
incrimination. 44 The focus of these safeguards is on adequately ap-
apply only when police interrogate a suspect while the suspect is in custody, id. at 477-78,
the question of whether a defendant has been taken into custody is often critical in deter-
mining whether the Miranda procedures are required in a particular situation. See, e.g.,
Orozco v. Texas, 394 U.S. 324, 327 (1969) (deeming accused to be in custody and holding
Miranda warnings to be required because officer testified that accused, questioned in his
bedroom in the early hours of morning with several police guns drawn on him, was under
arrest and not free to leave); United States v. Lee, 699 F.2d 466, 467-68 (9th Cir. 1982) (per
curiam) (deeming questioning undertaken by F.B.I. agents in a closed car for at least an
hour to be custodial even though agents informed accused that he was free to leave); cf.
Beckwith v. United States, 425 U.S. 341, 343-44, 347 (1983) (per curiam) (not requiring
Miranda warnings when defendant, not under arrest, voluntarily talked to two special
agents of the Internal Revenue Service).
Some of the factors that courts consider in determining whether custody exists include
the person's status as a suspect or as an arrestee, see United States v. Ledezma-Hernandez,
729 F.2d 310, 313 (5th Cir. 1984) (holding that the defendant was not in custody because
police had not focused the investigation on the defendant at time incriminating statements
were made); United States v. Davis, 646 F.2d 1298, 1302 (8th Cir.) (holding that the defend-
ant was not in custody, in part because police had not arrested the defendant prior to or
during conversation with informant), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 868 (1981), and the duration of
the suspect's detention, see United States v. Chamberlin, 644 F.2d 1262, 1267 (9th Cir.
1980) (holding that a suspect is in custody when held in police car for 20 minutes while his
accomplice is sought), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 868 (1981); see also United States v. Lee, 699
F.2d 466, 467-68 (9th Cir. 1982) (per curiam). Other influential factors include the location
at which the interrogation takes place, see United States v. Ross, 719 F.2d 615, 621-22 (2d
Cir. 1983) (declaring that a suspect is not in custody when questioned at his place of busi-
ness); United States v. Dennis, 645 F.2d 517, 523 (5th Cir.) (same), cert. denied, 454 U.S.
1034 (1981), the physical constraints placed upon the suspect, see United States v. Booth,
669 F.2d 1231, 1236 (9th Cir. 1981) (handcuffing a factor in determining if suspect in cus-
tody), and the authority of the law enforcement officials to make an arrest, see United
States v. Jamieson-McKames Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 651 F.2d 532, 543 (8th Cir. 1981) (hold-
ing that the defendants were not in custody because FDA agents were without authority to
make arrests), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1016 (1982).
42. 384 U.S. at 467. The Miranda Court felt that, "without proper safeguards, [cus-
tody] containfed] inherently compelling pressures which work to undermine the individual's
will to resist and to compel him to speak where he would not otherwise do so freely." Id.;
see also Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973).
43. The fifth amendment privilege does not extend to all incriminating evidence ob-
tained from the accused. Only testimonial or communicative evidence, if elicited involunta-
rily, is proscribed. See, e.g., Washington v. Chrisman, 455 U.S. 1, 6 n.3 (1982) (concluding
that the defendant's act of returning to his room to retrieve his identification following his
arrest for possession of an alcoholic beverage by a minor was neither "incriminating" nor a
"testimonial communication," even though age was an element of the offense); United
States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 222-23 (1967) (compelling the defendant to speak in lineup
not testimonial because no compulsion to disclose knowledge); Schmerber v. California, 384
U.S. 757, 761 (1966) (holding compelled blood-alcohol content test not testimonial).
44. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444. The Miranda procedures apply regardless of whether
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prising the suspect of his rights, including the right to remain si-
lent, the right to confer with counsel, and the right to have counsel
appointed to represent him if he cannot afford to hire an
attorney.
45
A suspect voluntarily may waive his Miranda rights during
custody.46 To establish a waiver, the government must prove that
the accused knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived his
Miranda rights prior to making a statement.47 A Miranda waiver
need not be express, but may be inferred from the suspect's words
and actions. 48 To determine whether a waiver is valid, courts have
considered the defendant's age,4 9 education,5 0 mental capacity, 51
physical condition,52  and knowledge of the cause for the
interrogation.5"
the police charge the person subjected to custodial interrogation with a misdemeanor or a
felony. See Berkmeyer v. McCarty, 104 S. Ct. 3138, 3148 (1984). In Berkmeyer, however, the
Court declined to decide whether an accused has a fifth amendment right to appointed
counsel during interrogation if the suspected offense is so minor that he would not have a
sixth amendment right to appointed counsel at trial. Id. at 3148, n.21.
45. 384 U.S. at 467-76. See supra text accompanying note 4 (discussing the complete
Miranda warnings).
46. 384 U.S. at 475.
47. 384 U.S. at 444. The Court derived this standard from Johnson v. Zerbst, in
which the Supreme Court defined the appropriate waiver standard for sixth amendment
analysis. 304 U.S. 458 (1938). See Tague v. Louisiana, 444 U.S. 469, 471 (1980) (per curiam)
(holding that government bears burden of establishing that defendant understood waiver).
48. See North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369, 373, 375-76 (1979) (holding explicit
waiver of right to counsel under Miranda not necessary; court may infer waiver from the
defendant's words and actions); United States v. Melanson, 691 F.2d 579, 588-89 (1st Cir.)
(holding that the defendant's statement at bail hearing for purpose of exculpating co-de-
fendant constituted a waiver of his Miranda rights), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 856 (1981).
49. See United States v. White Bear, 668 F.2d 409, 413 (8th Cir. 1982) (per curiam)
(holding 17-year-old defendant of average intelligence capable of making a valid waiver).
50. See United States v. Kiendra, 663 F.2d 349, 351 (1st Cir. 1981) (holding defend-
ant with ninth grade education capable of making a valid waiver); Crisp v. Mayabb, 668
F.2d 1127, 1135, 1139 (10th Cir. 1981) (holding defendant's illiteracy relevant to waiver de-
termination), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 827 (1982).
51. See Henry v. Dees, 658 F.2d 406, 411 (5th Cir. 1981) (invalidating waiver by de-
fendant with low I.Q. when record showed that he could not comprehend the waiver proce-
dure and police took no extra precautions in determining if the defendant understood his
waiver).
52. See United States v. Phillips, 640 F.2d 87, 93-94 (7th Cir.) (determining the de-
fendant capable of making a valid waiver although allegedly weakened by alcohol and drug
withdrawal), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 991 (1981).
53. See United States v. Burger, 728 F.2d 140, 141 (2d Cir. 1984) (noting that lower
court should have considered accused's ignorance of subject matter of interrogation as a
factor in determining the validity of a waiver); Carter v. Garrison, 656 F.2d 68, 70 (4th Cir.
1981) (per curiam), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 952 (1982) (same); see also Note, Constitutional
Law-Custodial Interrogation-Should the Accused Have a Right to Know the Nature of
His Suspected Offense?, 35 MERCER L. REv. 935 (1974) (arguing that a suspect cannot make
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When the suspect does not have counsel present, however, a
heavy burden rests on the government to show a knowing and in-
telligent waiver.54 Accordingly, courts have refused to presume a
waiver from the accused's silence or confession . 5 Furthermore, in
Edwards v. Arizona,56 the Supreme Court held that even if law
enforcement officers have advised an accused of his rights, once an
accused invokes his right to counsel the government cannot prove
a valid waiver of the right to an attorney merely by demonstrating
that the defendant responded to further police-initiated
questioning.
5 7
Adherence to Miranda becomes crucial when the government
seeks to take its case against the accused to trial. Generally, the
government may not use evidence obtained in violation of Miranda
in its case-in-chief.58 The government, however, may introduce this
evidence solely to impeach the defendant's testimony.59 Federal
appellate courts may refuse to overturn a conviction when a de-
fendant's statements are improperly admitted at trial, but only if
the court determines that the statements were made voluntarily
and that their introduction into evidence constitutes harmless er-
ror.6 0 Moreover, a trial court always may admit any freely volun-
a knowing and intelligent waiver of his Miranda rights without knowing the offense with
which he is charged).
54. 384 U.S. at 475.
55. Id.; see North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369, 373 (1979) (holding that because
burden is on prosecution to prove valid waiver, courts must presume that a defendant did
not waive his rights); McDonald v. Lucas, 677 F.2d 518, 521-22 (5th Cir. 1982) (holding that
when no evidence exists suggesting waiver, the defendant did not waive his Miranda rights).
56. 451 U.S. 477 (1981).
57. Id. at 484.
58. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 479.
59. See United States v. Havens, 446 U.S. 620, 627-28 (1980) (holding that govern-
ment may use inadmissible evidence to impeach the defendant's statements during cross-
examination); Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714, 722-24 (1975) (holding that government may
use otherwise inadmissible evidence to impeach the defendant's statements made on direct
examination); Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 224 (1971) (same). The use of statements
taken in violation of Miranda for impeachment purposes often effectively bars the accused
from taking the stand at trial. See Note, Criminal Procedure-Testimony Obtained in Vio-
lation of Miranda Is Admissible in Evidence for Impeachment Purposes, 10 TULSA L.J. 697
(1975); Comment, The Impeachment Exception to the Constitutional Exclusionary Rules,
73 COLUM. L. REV. 1476 (1973).
60. See, e.g., United States v. Roper, 681 F.2d 1354, 1359 (11th Cir. 1982) (holding
admission of the defendant's statement obtained in violation of Miranda harmless error
because statement only proved a fact not in dispute at trial), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1207
(1983); United States v. Wilson, 690 F.2d 1267, 1275 (9th Cir. 1982) (finding Miranda viola-
tion harmless error when evidence, excluding the evidence unconstitutionally obtained, es-
tablishes guilt beyond reasonable doubt); United States v. Duncan, 693 F.2d 971, 979 (9th
Cir. 1982) (upholding the defendant's conviction despite statements obtained in violation of
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teered or spontaneous statements despite a violation of the Mi-
randa procedural safeguards. 61 Appellate courts, however, must
reverse a conviction based in whole or in part on an involuntary
statement, even if the statement is reliable and other evidence
fully supports the conviction. 2
Under Miranda police must protect carefully the accused's
right to confer with an attorney prior to questioning." Interrogat-
ing officers may not imply that the offer of an appointed attorney
applies only to some future time subsequent to interrogation.6 4
Once a suspect invokes his right to counsel, the interrogation must
cease immediately until an attorney is present,5 or until the sus-
pect gives a valid waiver of the previously invoked right,"6 or until
the suspect "initiates further communication, exchanges, or con-
versations with the police. 6s7 In Oregon v. Bradshaw"s the Su-
preme Court held that the defendant, after requesting counsel, ini-
tiated further conversation with police because the defendant
showed "a willingness and a desire for a generalized discussion
about the investigation. 6'9 The Court carefully pointed out that a
Miranda because the government presented sufficient independent evidence of guilt).
61. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 486, 478 (1966); see, e.g., United States v. Castro,
723 F.2d 1527 (11th Cir. 1984); United States v. Baldwin, 644 F.2d 381 (5th Cir. 1981) (per
curiam).
62. See Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368, 376 (1964). Courts exclude involuntary con-
fessions to deter coercive law enforcement conduct. Id. at 385-86.
63. California v. Prysock, 453 U.S. 355, 360-61 (1981) (per curiam). In Prysock the
Court held that the lower court had erred in finding that the Miranda warnings were insuffi-
cient simply because of the order in which they were given to the defendant. Id. See Com-
ment, Criminal Law: The Accused's Right to Miranda Warnings-or Their Functional
Equivalent, 21 WASHBURN L.J. 427 (1982).
64. 453 U.S. at 360; see United States v. Contreras, 667 F.2d 976, 979 (11th Cir.)
(stating that although the defendant was not informed of his right to have counsel ap-
pointed immediately, no Miranda violation occurred because the defendant was informed of
the right to consult with an attorney prior to questioning), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 849 (1982).
65. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. at 474. When an accused expresses a desire to coop-
erate with officers only through counsel, officers must cease further interrogation until the
defendant confers with counsel. Id. at 484-85.
66. Id. at 475-76; see supra notes 46-57 and accompanying text (discussing waiver of
the right to counsel).
67. Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 485 (1981); see Oregon v. Bradshaw, 462 U.S.
1039, 1045 (1983) (holding that the defendant's question, "Well, what is going to happen to
me now?," initiated further conversation); see also Wyrick v. Fields, 459 U.S. 42 (1982) (per
curiam); Witt v. Wainwright, 714 F.2d 1069 (11th Cir. 1983); United States v. Gordon, 655
F.2d 478 (2d Cir. 1981).
68. 462 U.S. 1039 (1983).
69. Id. at 1045-46. The Court, however, observed that a routine request, such as deal-
ing with a clerical matter, by either the defendant or the interrogating officers generally will
not be considered an initiation of conversation. Id. at 1045.
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suspect's initiation of discussions does not waive the previously in-
voked right to an attorney, but allows further interrogation in the
absence of counsel only if police subsequently obtain a valid waiver
from the suspect.70
Recently, in Smith v. Illinois,1 the Supreme Court reiterated
its rule that all questioning must cease when an accused invokes
the right to counsel. 2 The Court further held that once a suspect
has made an unequivocal demand for counsel, subsequent ambigu-
ous statements regarding his desire for counsel may not be used to
cast doubt on the clarity of the initial request.73 The Smith Court
recognized that lower courts had applied differing standards in de-
termining whether an accused's ambiguous statements constituted
an invocation of the right to counsel. Because the Court found that
the defendant's requests for counsel were unequivocal,7 4 however,
the Court declined to resolve the conflict among the lower courts.75
The cases that follow illustrate the three different approaches that
various courts have developed in attempting to determine whether
70. Id. at 1044-45. See Wyrick v. Fields, 459 U.S. 42 (1982). In Wyrick the Court
indicated that once the police obtain a valid waiver, interrogation may continue until cir-
cumstances change to a degree that the interrogators can no longer consider the answers to
be voluntary or until the defendant revokes his waiver. Id. at 47. The Wyrick Court held
that by requesting a polygraph examination the defendant waived his right to counsel dur-
ing the test and the interrogation that followed. Id.
71. 105 S. Ct. 490 (1984). See supra notes 15-23 and accompanying text.
72. 105 S. Ct. at 492.
73. Id. at 495. In Smith v. Illinois police arrested the defendant for armed robbery.
As an officer informed the defendant of his Miranda rights and his right to have counsel
appointed and present at the interrogation, the defendant replied, "Uh, yeah, I'd like to do
that." Id. at 491 (emphasis in original). The officer finished reading the Miranda warnings,
then asked the defendant, "Do you wish to talk to me at this time without a lawyer being
present?" Defendant answered: "Yeah and no, uh, I don't know what's what, really." Id. at
491-92 (emphasis in original). After further questioning, the defendant agreed to talk to the
officer and then admitted to the crime. Id. at 492. The trial court denied a motion to sup-
press the confession and subsequently convicted the defendant. The Illinois Court of Ap-
peals affirmed the conviction, finding that although the defendant's first statement
("Uh,yeah. I'd like to do that.") appeared unambiguous, the defendant's statements as a
whole indicated that the defendant had not intended to invoke his right to counsel. The
Illinois Supreme Court also affirmed the conviction, noting that the defendant "did not
clearly assert his right to counsel" and that the defendant's statements, "considered in to-
tal, were ambiguous, and did not effectively invoke his right to counsel." Id. (emphasis in
original) (quoting People v. Smith, 102 Ill. 2d 365, 373, 466 N.E.2d 236, 240 (1984)).
The United States Supreme Court reversed. The Court refused to consider the defend-
ant's later responses as evidence of a lack of intent to invoke the right to counsel because
the Court found the defendant's initial response to be unequivocal. The Court held that the
government could not use subsequent equivocal responses to "cast doubt on the clarity of
[the accused's] initial request for counsel." 105 S.Ct. at 491.
74. 105 S.Ct. at 493, 495.
75. Id. at 493.
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a defendant has invoked the right to counsel.
III. DETERMINING WHAT CONSTITUTES AN INVOCATION OF THE
RIGHT TO COUNSEL
A. Threshold of Clarity Standard
In People v. Krueger8 the Illinois Supreme Court held that an
accused's references to an attorney must, meet a threshold stan-
dard of clarity7" before a court will consider the statements to be
an invocation of the right to counsel.78 In Krueger law enforcement
officers arrested and charged the defendant with stabbing a man to
death during a late night argument.7 9 Before beginning the interro-
gation, police gave the defendant his full Miranda warnings.8 0 The
defendant stated that he understood his rights and signed a writ-
ten "waiver of rights" form.8 1 As the police began to question the
defendant about the stabbing, the defendant accused the police of
trying to "pin a murder" on him and stated that maybe he needed
a lawyer.8 2 A police detective replied that the news media, not the
76. 82 Ill. 2d 305, 412 N.E.2d 537 (1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 1019 (1981). Prior to
Krueger, a number of Illinois courts had held that almost any reference to an attorney
would be considered an invocation of the right to counsel. See, e.g., People v. Starling, 64 Ill.
App. 3d 671, 381 N.E.2d 817 (1978) (considering the defendant's nodding of his head affirm-
atively to his father's warning that he consult with an attorney before answering any ques-
tions an invocation of the right to counsel); People v. Rafac, 51 InI. App. 3d 1, 364 N.E.2d
991 (1977) (holding the defendant's inquiry into how he could obtain a lawyer to be an
invocation of the right to counsel); see also Maglio v. Jago, 580 F.2d 202, 205 (6th Cir. 1978)
(holding the defendant's statement, "[M]aybe [I] ought to have [an attorney]," to be an
invocation of the right to counsel).
77. In Smith v. Illinois, 105 S. Ct. 490, 493, n.3 (1985), the United States Supreme
Court cited Krueger as representing those courts that "have attempted to define a threshold
standard of clarity . . . and have held that requests falling below this threshold do not
trigger the right to counsel."
78. Krueger, 82 Ill. 2d at 311, 412 N.E.2d at 540.
79. Id. After his girlfriend submitted a sworn statement describing the incident, po-
lice charged the defendant with murder by stabbing his victim several times with a knife
while the two struggled in a car. Id. at 307, 412 N.E.2d at 537.
80. Id. at 308, 412 N.E.2d at 538.
81. Id. The police first questioned the defendant about crimes unrelated to the mur-
der. The defendant admitted to being involved in several burglaries, but stated that he had
not been involved in any other criminal activities. Id.
82. The police officers present at the interrogation gave three slightly different ver-
sions of the defendant's exact statement. According to one detective, the defendant said,
"Wait a minute. Maybe I ought to have an attorney. You guys are trying to pin a murder
rap on me, give me 20 to 40 years." Id. Another detective testified that the defendant par-
tially raised up out of his chair and stated, "Hey, you're trying to pin a murder on me.
Maybe I need a lawyer." Id. The third police officer testified that the defendant said, "Just
a minute. That's a 20 to 40 year sentence. Maybe I ought to talk to an attorney. You're
trying to pin a murder rap on me." Id.
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police, had said that the stabbing was murder and that of the two
people who knew what had happened, one of them was dead.8 3
Shortly thereafter, the defendant gave a written confession in
which he admitted that he had stabbed the victim and described
the circumstances surrounding the incident. 4 The next morning,
the defendant, after stating that he still understood his rights, re-
sponded to further police questioning.85 Before trial, the defendant
sought to suppress the inculpatory statements that he had made to
the police during his interrogation. 6 The defendant argued that
the police had violated his Miranda rights by continuing to inter-
rogate him following his request for counsel. 7 The circuit court de-
nied the defendant's suppression motion and the defendant was
subsequently convicted at trial.88
The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed the defendant's convic-
tion.8 9 Although recognizing that the "in any manner" language of
Miranda" signifies that an invocation of the right to counsel need
not be "explicit, unequivocal, or made with unmistakable clar-
ity,"'91 the court refused to find that every reference to an attorney,
no matter how ambiguous, constitutes an invocation of the right to
83. Id., 412 N.E.2d at 538-39.
84. Id., 412 N.E.2d at 539.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 307, 412 N.E.2d at 538.
87. 82 Ill.2d at 307, 412 N.E.2d at 538.
88. Id. The circuit court found that the defendant voluntarily made the inculpatory
statements, that the defendant understood his rights, and that the police did not violate his
rights. Id. at 309, 412 N.E.2d at 540. On appeal, the defendant reiterated his contention that
the police obtained his statements through an interrogation that was continued after he had
invoked his right to counsel. People v. Krueger, 74 Ill. App. 3d 881, 393 N.E.2d 1283 (1979).
In affirming the conviction, the appellate court held that the defendant's reference to a
lawyer did not constitute a request for counsel under Miranda. Id. at 885-86, 393 N.E.2d at
1287. The appellate court placed some reliance on Frazier v. Cupp, 394 U.S. 731 (1969), a
case in which the defendant was convicted prior to the Miranda decision.
In Frazier the defendant responded to some initial questioning, then told police "I
think I had better get a lawyer before I talk any more. I am going to get in more trouble
than I am in now." Id. at 738. The Supreme Court stated that the defendant had not made
a request under the Escobedo standard, see supra notes 31-37 and accompanying text, suffi-
cient to require a cessation of police interrogation. 394 U.S. at 739. The Court then noted
that it was not determining whether the defendant's ambiguous comment would be a suffi-
cient invocation of the right to counsel under Miranda. Id. at 738.
89. 82 Ill. 2d at 312, 412 N.E.2d at 541.
90. The Supreme Court stated in Miranda: "If [the accused] indicates in any man-
ner and at any stage of the process that he wishes to consult with an attorney before speak-
ing there can be no questioning." 384 U.S. at 444-45 (emphasis added); see supra notes 11-
12 and accompanying text.
91. 82 IM. 2d at 311, 412 N.E. 2d at 540.
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counsel."' The court, therefore, required that the defendant meet a
threshold standard of clarity for his remarks to constitute an invo-
cation of the right to counsel.93 In deciding that the defendant did
not invoke the right to counsel, the court considered many factors
as influential in determining the meaning of the defendant's equiv-
ocal remarks. These factors included the court's findings that the
defendant possessed normal intelligence, fully understood his Mi-
randa rights, and effectively waived his rights before questioning.
Furthermore, the court noted that the interrogation lasted for only
a brief time period and that the defendant was under no coercion
or duress other than that inherent in any custodial setting.94 The
court also placed some importance on the interrogating officers'
subjective belief that the defendant's remarks did not indicate that
he wished to consult with an attorney. 5 Finally, the court discred-
ited the defendant's testimony that he felt a more explicit request




95. Id. The court stated that the good faith conduct of the police helped to distin-
guish Krueger from a line of similar cases decided in other jurisdictions. See, e.g., Maglio v.
Jago, 580 F.2d 202 (6th Cir. 1978) (defendant thought attorney unnecessary because he had
already confessed); State v. Nash, 119 N.H. 728, 407 A.2d 365 (1979) (police told the defend-
ant he was sick and needed help that the police could provide); People v. Superior Court, 15
Cal. 3d 729, 542 P.2d 1390, 125 Cal. Rptr. 798 (1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 816 (1976)
(police disregarded the defendants' statements about needing an attorney); People v.
Munoz, 83 Cal. App. 3d 993, 148 Cal Rptr. 165 (1978) (police ignored the defendant's re-
quest' for attorney). However, the Krueger court, citing Miranda, also warned against plac-
ing too much emphasis on the subjective belief of the officers. 82 IlM. 2d at 311, 412 N.E.2d
at 540 (citing Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 486 n.55 (1966)).
96. 82 Ill. 2d at 312, 412 N.E.2d at 540. At trial, the defendant testified that he had
requested an attorney when the officers had questioned him about the stabbing. During the
cross-examination of the defendant, the following dialogue took place:
Q. Why did you continue talking to [the police] after you say you said, 'I think I should
have an attorney?'
A. Have you ever been interrogated by three Rockford Police Detectives?
Q. No, I haven't, but I want to know why you continued talking to them.
A. Because I believed it was self-defense. I still do. They wanted a statement of what
happened to clear it up. I wanted to get it off my chest, so I gave them a statement.
Q. But you know you had a right to have an attorney there if you wanted one, didn't
you?
A. Yes, I did.
Q. You ever insist on having an attorney contacted?
A. I asked for an attorney before I began the statement, and I saw that it was not going
to get me anywhere, so I just ceased on that line, because I just knew I wasn't going to get
an attorney anyways.
Q. Did it occur to you not to talk any further?
A. Yes, but it occurred to me I might be up all night and be badgered by these three
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court found that the inculpatory statements resulted from the de-
fendant's desire to tell his own story and to ease his conscience,
undermining the defendant's assertion of a desire for an attorney
prior to questioning.
9 7
Since People v. Krueger several Illinois courts9" have applied
the threshold standard of clarity test set forth in Krueger.9 In
People v. Harper'00 an Illinois appellate court, citing Krueger,"0 '
held that the defendant's request, made while he was in custody,
that a police officer retrieve a wallet from his car so that the de-
fendant could obtain his lawyer's business card102 was not an invo-
cation of the right to counsel.0'0 The court stressed that although
the defendant was completely aware of his right to counsel and of
his right to stop the interrogation at any time, the defendant never
stated clearly that he desired to invoke those rights.1'0 In People v.
Kendricks'0 5 another Illinois appellate court applied the Krueger
test and found the defendant's statement'0 6 too ambiguous to con-
stitute an invocation of the right to counsel.10 7 Disregarding the
Krueger court's emphasis on an officer's subjective, good faith be-
lief that the defendant did not mean to invoke his right to counsel,
detectives.
Id. at 309, 412 N.E.2d at 539.
97. Id. at 312, 412 N.E.2d at 540.
98. See, e.g., People v. Harper, 94 Il1. App. 3d 298, 418 N.E.2d 894 (1981) (holding
the defendant's request for his attorney's business card not to be an invocation of the right
to counsel); People v. Winston, 106 Ill. App. 3d 673, 435 N.E.2d 1327 (1982) (holding the
defendant's statement that he would be requesting an attorney "eventually" not to be a
present request for counsel); People v. Kendricks, 121 Ill. App. 3d 442, 459 N.E.2d 1137
(1984) (declaring the defendant's statement that he might need a lawyer not an invocation
of right to counsel); People v. Wieland, 123 Ill. App. 3d 576, 462 N.E.2d 1256 (1984) (finding
the defendant's statement that he did not know whether he should take polygraph test
without consulting attorney not to be a request for counsel); Illinois v. Smith, 102 Ill. 2d
365, 466 N.E. 2d 236 (1984) (holding the defendant's statements too ambiguous to consti-
tute an invocation of the right to counsel), rev'd, 105 S. Ct. 490 (1985).
99. See infra text accompanying note 113.
100. 94 Ill. App. 3d 298, 418 N.E.2d 894 (1981).
101. Id. at 300, 418 N.E.2d at 896.
102. The defendant testified concerning his conversation with the officer, "I wanted to
call a lawyer by the name of Stan Pisani, but I didn't know the number by heart. The wallet
was in the car and the card in my car.., and I asked him if possibly he could get it for me
and told him I had a lawyer's card in it and he told me it wouldn't be necessary." Id.
103. Id., 418 N.E.2d at 897.
104. Id., 418 N.E.2d at 896.
105. 121 Ill. App. 3d 442, 459 N.E.2d 1137 (1984).
106. The defendant's statement was expressed as either "You know, I kind of think I
know [sic] a lawyer, don't I" or "I think I might need a lawyer," Id. at 445, 459 N.E.2d at
1140.
107. Id. at 447, 459 N.E.2d at 1141.
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the Kendricks court found the defendant's statement too ambigu-
ous even though his interrogators admittedly considered the de-
fendant's statement to be an invocation of his right to counsel.110
The court held that the inquiry should center on the objective
meaning of a defendant's statements rather than the meaning at-
tached to the statements by the interrogators.10 9
In jurisdictions other than Illinois, some courts specifically
have rejected the threshold standard of clarity test articulated in
Krueger, 10 while other courts have applied tests similar to the
Krueger approach."' In State v. Johnson,"2 for example, the Iowa
Supreme Court held that a defendant had not invoked his right to
counsel although he asked his interrogators twice whether he
should have his lawyer present."13 Citing Krueger,"4 the Iowa court
found that because the defendant had exhibited indecision con-
cerning his desire for counsel, he had not made a statement suffi-
ciently clear to invoke his right to counsel." 5 Generally, courts ad-
hering to the Krueger approach have been reluctant to hold that




110. See State v. Moulds, 105 Idaho 880, 673 P.2d 1074 (1983).
111. See State v. Johnson, 318 N.W.2d 417 (Iowa 1982); see also Donovon v. State, 400
So. 2d 1306, 1310 (Fla. 1981) (finding no invocation of the right to counsel when a juvenile
defendant inquired of police whether the defendant could obtain an attorney without cost to
him); State v. Phillips, 563 S.W.2d 47, 50-54 (Mo. 1978) (finding no invocation of the right
to counsel when the defendant stated that he did not know whether he should consult with
an attorney); Commonwealth v. Weaver, 418 A.2d 565, 569 (Pa. 1980) (finding no invocation
of the right to counsel when the defendant inquired of the officer whether the officer
thought she needed an attorney and the officer told her that the decision was hers to make).
112. 318 N.W.2d 417 (Iowa 1982).
113. Id. at 430.
114. Id. at 431.
115. Id. at 430.
116. See, e.g., People v. Harper, 94 IM. App. 3d 298, 418 N.E.2d 894 (1981) (holding
that the defendant's request for his billfold containing his lawyer's card was insufficient to
constitute an invocation of the right to counsel); People v. Winston, 106 Ill. App. 3d 673, 435
N.E.2d 1327, 1330 (1982) (holding the defendant's statement, "I'm not sure whether I want
to tell you about it. I mean I want to tell somebody, but if I tell you, you're going to use it
against me. And if I tell my own lawyer, he'll use it for me," to be insufficient for invoca-
tion); People v. Smith, 102 IlM. 2d 365, 466 N.E.2d 236 (1984) (holding the defendant's state-
ments not to be an invocation of the right to counsel because full context of statements
expressed only indecisiveness about the desire for counsel), rev'd, 105 S.Ct. 490 (1984); Peo-
ple v. Wieland, 123 Il. App. 3d 576, 462 N.E.2d 1256 (1984) (holding the defendant's ex-
pression of reluctance to take polygraph test without counsel being appointed not to be an
invocation of the right to counsel because reference was too ambiguous). But see People v.
Meyers, 109 Ill. App. 3d 862, 441 N.E.2d 397, 402 (1982) (holding defendant's statement,
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B. Cessation of Interrogation Upon Any Reference to An
Attorney Standard
Ochoa v. State117 illustrates a second approach to the issue of
what statements or conduct constitute an invocation of the right to
counsel. In Ochoa a Texas criminal appeals court reversed a de-
fendant's murder conviction on the grounds that the lower court
improperly had admitted into evidence a confession obtained in vi-
olation of the Miranda requirements."" After arresting the defend-
ant at the scene of the crime, the authorities read the defendant
his Miranda rights in at least three separate locations before be-
ginning interrogation.1 9 As the questioning began, the defendant
stated either that he thought he should talk to an attorney before
answering any questions or signing anything 20 or that he might
want to talk to an attorney. 12' The police then gave the defendant
coffee and cigarettes and began talking about matters other than
the shooting, returning to the subject of the murder after approxi-
mately one-half hour.122 Three hours later, the defendant signed a
written confession that the interrogating officers prepared. 123 Dur-
ing the subsequent interrogation, the defendant failed to make any
references to an attorney.
2 4
At trial the defendant brought a motion to suppress the con-
fession.' 25 The trial court denied the motion, finding that the de-
"Do you think I should have an attorney?" or "Who do you recommend as an attorney?" to
be an invocation of the right to counsel).
117. 573 S.W.2d 796 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978).
118. Id. at 801. The defendant shot and killed a police officer after the officer had
stopped him for a traffic violation. Id. at 798-99. At trial, the defendant admitted shooting
the officer, but claimed that the action was in self-defense. Id.
119. Id. at 799. After reading the defendant his Miranda warnings at the site of his
arrest, police took the defendant before a magistrate and again read the defendant his Mi-
randa rights. Id. The defendant stated that he understood his rights and signed a paper. Id.
Shortly thereafter, police took the defendant to an interrogation room where they read the
defendant his Miranda rights a third time. Id. The defendant initially indicated that he did
not wish to speak to police at that time. He was taken to his jail cell, but was brought back
for interrogation two hours later. Id.
120. Id. This statement represents the testimony of the defendant.
121. Id. This statement represents the testimony of the interrogating officer.
122. Id. at 800. The interrogating officer admitted that his purpose in discussing those
other matters with the defendant was to "calm and relax him and to 'get on his good side,'
and to thus get [defendant] to make a statement." Id.
123. Id. The defendant did not read the statement, but had the interrogating officer
read it to him. This confession was taken at 6:20 a.m., approximately seven hours after
police arrested the defendant and after almost three hours of continuous interrogation
about the murder.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 798. The defendant also challenged the accuracy of the confession, contend-
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fendant had given the confession voluntarily and knowingly. The
trial court also held that the defendant knowingly and voluntarily
had waived his right to counsel and his protection against self-in-
crimination.'26 The trial court subsequently convicted the defend-
ant of murder.
The criminal appeals court reversed the defendant's convic-
tion, concluding that the State had failed to meet the heavy bur-
den, imposed by Miranda v. Arizona,2 of demonstrating that the
defendant knowingly and intelligently had waived his right to
counsel. 1'2 8 Furthermore, noting that Miranda requires a cessation
of all interrogation once a defendant invokes a Miranda right,12 9
the court asserted that when "a defendant indicates in any way
that he desires to invoke his right to counsel, interrogation must
cease."' 30 Finding that the defendant's statements to the police
ing that several statements were false and that he had not made them. Id.
126. Id.
127. 384 U.S. 436, 475 (1966). Miranda holds that "[i]f the interrogation continues
without the presence of an attorney and a statement is taken, a heavy burden rests on the
government to demonstrate that the defendant knowingly and intelligently waived his, privi-
lege against self-incrimination and his right to retained or appointed counsel." Id. See supra
notes 46-57 and accompanying text.
128. 573 S.W.2d at 800.
129. Id. The court quoted from Miranda, "The defendant may waive effectuation of
these rights, provided the waiver is made voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently. If, how-
ever, he indicates in any manner and at any stage of the process that he wishes to consult
with an attorney before speaking there can be no questioning." Id. (quoting Miranda v.
Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444-45 (1966)) (emphasis added by the Ochoa court).
130. 573 S.W.2d at 800. (emphasis added by the Ochoa court); see also Connecticut v.
Barrett, 197 Conn. 50, 495 A.2d 1044 (1985), cert. granted, 54 U.S.L.W. 3761 (May 19,
1986). For cases which have indicated that ambiguous remarks should be encompassed by
Miranda's "in any manner" language, see White v. Finkbeiner, 611 F.2d 186, 190 (7th Cir.
1979) (holding the defendant's statement, "I'd rather see an attorney," to be an invocation
of the right to counsel); United States v. Clark, 499 F.2d 802, 808 (4th Cir. 1974) (holding
the defendant's statement, "I had better talk to a lawyer," to be a request for counsel);
United States v. Lilla, 534 F. Supp. 1247, 1279-80 (N.D.N.Y. 1982) (holding one suspect's
request to his mother to reach his attorney by telephone to be an exercise of his right to
counsel; second suspect "explicitly invoked his right to counsel by attempting to contact his
attorney directly, and by arranging for his mechanic to reach his attorney"); United States
v. DeLeon, 412 F.Supp. 89 (D. V.I. 1976) (holding the defendant's request to both make a
statement and see a lawyer to be an invocation of the right to counsel); People v. Traubert,
199 Colo. 322, 327, 608 P.2d 342, 346 (1980) (recognizing that "[a]lthough the defendant's
statement 'I think I need to see an attorney' was neither 'sophisticated' nor, perhaps, in a
'legally proper form,' it was sufficient ... to put the police officers on notice that the de-
fendant intended to exercise his constitutional rights to counsel"); Wentela v. State, 95 Wis.
2d 283, 292, 290 N.W.2d 312, 316 (1980) (finding "the defendant's statement, 'I think I need
an attorney' is a sufficient request for counsel"); State v. Blakney, 605 P.2d 1093, 1097
(Mont. 1979) (holding the defendant's statement "maybe I should have an attorney" is
"within the 'indicates in any manner' language set out in Miranda as the requirement for an
effective assertion of the right to counsel"), vacated on other grounds, 451 U.S. 1013 (1981);
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were an invocation of his right to counsel, the court held that the
continued interrogation of the defendant violated his Miranda
rights and that the confession obtained during the continued inter-
rogation was inadmissible. 13' The court concluded that although
the defendant did not unequivocally state his desire for counsel,
the defendant nevertheless manifested a wish to see an attorney
sufficient to require that the interrogation cease.132
In People v. Superior Court'3 3 (Zolnay) the California Su-
preme Court adopted a view similar to the Ochoa approach. The
California court upheld a trial court's decision to suppress the de-
fendants' confessions and certain evidence recovered following the
confessions because they were taken in violation of the prescribed
Miranda requirements.13 4 In Zolnay police arrested the defendants
and advised them of their Miranda rights.3 5 During questioning of
the defendants in a single room, the interrogating officers con-
fronted the defendants with some of the evidence that the police
had gathered and asserted their belief that the defendants were
guilty. 36 One defendant then stated either, "I guess we need a law-
yer" or "Do you think we need an attorney?"' 7 One officer an-
State v. Ayers, 16 Or. App. 300, 518 P.2d 190 (1974) (finding the defendant's statement,
expressed as either "Maybe I should see an attorney" or "I should talk to an attorney," to
constitute an invocation of the right to counsel).
131. 573 S.W.2d at 800-01. But see Palmes v. Wainwright, 725 F.2d 1511, 1517 (11th
Cir.) (refusing "to turn [the] statement 'I will talk to you without counsel, but I won't sign a
written waiver form,' into 'I want an attorney' "), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 227 (1984).
132. 573 S.W.2d at 800-01. Subsequent Texas cases have not followed closely the rea-
soning set forth in Ochoa. See, e.g., Goodnough v. State, 627 S.W.2d 841, 844 (Tex. Ct. App.
1982) (allowing clarifying questions following ambiguous statements); Huff v. State, 678
S.W.2d, 236, 242 (Tex. Ct. App. 1984) (same); Beck v. State, 681 S.W.2d 825, 827 (Tex. Ct.
App. 1984) (same); see also Bautista v. State, 632 S.W.2d 846, 849 (Tex. Ct. App. 1982)
(applying a threshold standard of clarity test to find that the defendants had not invoked
their right to counsel); Tanner v. State, 690 S.W.2d 96, 98 (Tex. 1985) (same). But see State
v. Nash, 119 N.H. 728, 730, 407 A.2d 365, 367 (1979) (following Ochoa).
133. 15 Cal. 3d 729, 542 P.2d 1390, 125 Cal. Rptr. 798 (1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S.
816 (1976).
134. Id. at 731, 737, 542 P.2d at 1391, 1395, 125 Cal. Rptr. at 799, 803. The two de-
fendants in Zolnay allegedly committed a burglary. The police first questioned the defend-
ants in their hotel room after advising each defendant of his Miranda rights. Both defend-
ants denied participating in the burglary. The next morning, the defendants appeared at the
police station for further interrogation where the police fingerprinted them and questioned
the two defendants separately. The police did not readvise the defendants of their Miranda
rights prior to any of the interrogation conducted at the police station. Id. at 732-34, 542
P.2d at 1391-92, 125 Cal. Rptr. at 799-800.
135. 15 Cal. 3d at 731, 542 P.2d at 1391, 125 Cal. Rptr. at 799.
136. Id. at 732, 542 P.2d at 1392, 125 Cal. Rptr. at 800.
137. Id. The court noted that the record of the trial court contained varying accounts.
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swered affirmatively and the defendant asked that officer whether
he could recommend an attorney 38 The officer replied that he
could not, but informed the defendants that they could call one of
the local attorneys listed in the telephone directory.8 " After advis-
ing the defendants that the investigation would continue until the
officers discovered the facts and that the defendants could make
the officers' jobs "'easy' or 'tough'," the officers left the defendants
alone with a telephone directory. 140 A few minutes later, the of-
ficers returned and asked the defendants whether they had made
any decisions. The defendants then confessed to the crime. 41
The California Supreme Court held that the defendants had
invoked their Miranda rights by their references to an attorney
and, as a result, that the confessions procured during the subse-
quent interrogation were inadmissible. 42 The court emphasized
that no particular form of words or conduct is necessary for a de-
fendant to invoke the fifth amendment privilege against self-in-
crimination. 143 To resolve ambiguities against a defendant, the
court held, "would subvert Miranda's prophylactic intent"' 44 to at-
tach procedural safeguards to an accused's fifth amendment
rights.14  The court found that, under these particular circum-
stances, the references by one of the defendants to an attorney
served as an assertion of both defendants' Miranda rights.14 6 The
court asserted that the defendants' specific request to the officers
regarding recommendation of a lawyer demonstrated that their in-
138. Id. Two Illinois appellate courts have held that a defendant may invoke his right
to counsel by requesting that an officer recommend an attorney. See People v. Meyers, 109
Ill. App. 3d 862, 441 N.E.2d 397 (1982); People v. Rafae, 51111. App. 3d 1, 364 N.E.2d 991
(1972).
139. 15 Cal. 3d at 732, 542 P.2d at 1392, 125 Cal. Rptr. at 800.
140. Id.
141. Id. Subsequently, the defendants signed written statements of confession. Id.
142. Id. at 737, 542 P.2d at 1394, 125 Cal. Rptr. at 803.
143. Id. at 736, 542 P.2d at 1394-95, 125 Cal. Rptr. at 802-03.
144. The Supreme Court has characterized the Miranda warnings as "prophylactic"
because the warnings are nonconstitutional safeguards to constitutionally-protected privi-
leges. See New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 671 (1984) (O'Connor, J., dissenting in part);
Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 444 (1974).
145. 15 Cal. 3d at 736, 542 P.2d at 1395, 125 Cal. Rptr. at 802-03 (quoting People v.
Randall, 1 Cal. 3d 948, 955, 464 P.2d 114, 118, 83 Cal. Rptr. 658, 662 (1970)).
146. 15 Cal. 3d at 736, 542 P.2d at 1395, 125 Cal. Rptr. at 803. The court emphasized
that the defendants "were interrogated jointly and that the officers' questions regarding
their desire to speak with or to consult an attorney were addressed to both." Id. The court,
therefore, dismissed the government's contention that both defendants could not rely upon




terest in obtaining counsel was a present desire instead of a future
concern about the need for an attorney.
147
California courts since Zolnay have adopted its per se rule
that interrogation must cease when an accused refers to an attor-
ney, regardless of the ambiguity of the words used. 148 In People v.
Duran,4" for instance, a California court held that the defendant's
statements indicated a present unwillingness to speak with the in-
terrogating officers without first consulting an attorney. 150 The
court stated that, regardless of whatever uncertainty the defendant
expressed, "[a]mbiguous statements are to be construed as invoca-
tions" of Miranda rights.' 5' The court concluded that because the
defendant invoked his right to counsel, all questioning should have
ceased and the trial court should not have admitted the subse-
quently obtained confession.'
52
In People v. Russo 55 a California appellate court stated that
police may ask clarifying questions to determine whether an ac-
147. Id. at 736, 542 P.2d at 1394-95, 125 Cal. Rptr. at 803.
148. See People v. Hinds, 154 Cal. App. 3d 222, 201 Cal. Rptr. 104 (1984) ("Tell me
the truth, wouldn't it be best if I had an attorney with me?" held to have invoked the
defendant's Miranda rights); People v. Duran, 140 Cal. App. 3d 485, 189 Cal. Rptr 595
("Well then I think it's better that I have an attorney here, but other than that, I'll give you
my version of it, you know" or "I'll just tell you what, you know, what I did and, you know
but I mean, or have you got an attorney right here present, close?" held to have invoked the
defendant's Miranda rights), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 991 (1983); People v. Russo, 148 Cal.
App. 3d 1172, 196 Cal. Rptr. 466 (1983) ("I don't know if I should have a lawyer here or
what?" held to have invoked the defendant's Miranda rights); People v. Quirk, 129 Cal.
App. 3d 628, 181 Cal. Rptr. 301 (1982) (defendant's question of a government appointed
psychiatrist concerning whether his wife had hired an attorney invoked the defendant's Mi-
randa rights); People v. Munoz, 83 Cal. App. 3d 993, 148 Cal. Rptr. 165 (1978) ("Well,
maybe I should talk to an attorney" invoked the defendant's Miranda rights). But see Peo-
ple v. Bestelmeyer, 166 Cal. App. 3d 520, 212 Cal. Rptr. 605 (1985) ("I just thinkin', maybe I
shouldn't say anything without a lawyer and then I thinkin' ahh" held to be insufficiently
clear to invoke the defendant's Miranda rights).
149. 140 Cal. App. 3d 485, 189 Cal. Rptr. 595, cert. denied, 464 U.S. 991 (1983). In
Duran the court convicted the defendant of second degree murder for stabbing his wife's
suitor. Id. See supra note 148.
150. Id. at 492, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 599. The defendant stated, "I'll just tell you what,
you know, I did and, you know but I mean, or have you got an attorney right here present,
close?" The interrogating officer responded: "It will take quite a while to get one ... go
ahead." Id.
151. Id. The court, quoting an earlier California Supreme Court case, stated: "A prin-
cipal objective of [the Miranda] decision was to establish safeguards that would liberate
courts insofar as possible from the difficult and troublesome necessity of adjudicating in
each case whether coercive.., influences had been employed to secure admissions or confes-
sions." Id. (quoting People v. Ireland, 70 Cal. 2d 522, 450 P.2d 580, 75 Cal. Rptr. 188
(1969)).
152. 140 Cal. App. 3d at 492, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 599.
153. 148 Cal. App. 3d 1172, 196 Cal. Rptr. 466 (1983).
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cused understands his Miranda rights or the waiver of those rights,
but may not ask the accused whether his ambiguous statements
are an invocation of the right to counsel.154 According to the court
in Russo, questioning should have ceased as soon as the defendant
stated, "I don't know if I should have a lawyer here or what.'
1 55
Citing previous California decisions,"56 the court asserted that am-
biguous statements amount to an invocation of the right to coun-
sel. 157 The court observed that a policy of requiring unequivocal
statements in order to constitute an invocation of the right to
counsel effectively would penalize the less experienced defendant
whose ambiguous statements would not invoke the Miranda pro-
tections; a more experienced criminal, on the other hand, would
state precisely his desire for counsel and require the interrogation
to cease. 158
C. Immediate Narrowing of Questioning to Clarify Reference
Standard
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit es-
tablished a third approach for determining when an accused in-
vokes his right to counsel. In Nash v. Estelle5 e the Fifth Circuit
stated that when an accused makes an equivocal reference to an
attorney, police may inquire further to clarify the accused's
wishes. 160 In Nash the police arrested the defendant pursuant to a
warrant and brought him before a magistrate who read the defend-
ant the Miranda warnings.' 6 ' A few days later, the assistant dis-
trict attorney interviewed the defendant concerning the defend-
ant's impending murder charge. 62 The assistant district attorney
154. Id. at 1177, 196 Cal. Rptr. at 469.
155. Id. The court felt that this statement demonstrated that the defendant was not
presently willing to discuss the case freely and completely. Id.
156. See cases cited supra note 148.
157. 148 Cal. App. 3d at 1177, 196 Cal. Rptr. at 469.
158. 148 Cal. App. 3d at 1177, 196 Cal. Rptr. 469; accord People v. Duran, 140 Cal.
App. 3d 485, 189 Cal. Rptr. 595, cert. denied, 464 U.S. 991 (1983).
159. 597 F.2d 513 (5th Cir.), cert denied, 444 U.S. 981 (1979). In Nash, the defendant
was convicted of murder after a jury trial. Id. at 514. The federal district court granted the
defendant's petition for writ of habeas corpus on grounds that the trial court improperly
had admitted a written confession obtained in violation of the defendant's Miranda rights.
Id. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the district court's grant of habeas corpus
relief. Id.
160. Id. at 517.
161. Id. at 514.
162. Id. at 515. The defendant previously had confessed orally to the murder. Because,
however, the prosecution did not introduce this confession at the state trial, the Fifth Cir-
cuit did not have occasion to consider the admissibility of the confession. Id.
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readvised the defendant of his Miranda rights, inquiring after
reading each right whether the defendant understood it.16' After
the assistant district attorney again informed the defendant that
he could have a lawyer present during the interrogation, the de-
fendant stated, "Well, I don't have the money to hire one, but I
would like, you know, to have one appointed.' 1 4 The government's
attorney inquired: "You want one to be appointed for you?"' 6 5 Af-
ter the defendant replied affirmatively, the government's attorney
agreed to the defendant's request and stated that the interview
would have to cease immediately. 66 The defendant indicated that
he wanted to talk presently about the murder and stated, "I would
like to have a lawyer, but I'd rather talk to you."'6 7 After further
questioning to determine the defendant's wishes, the government's
attorney requested that the defendant sign a written waiver card
and then proceeded to procure a confession from the defendant."'6
The district court ruled that the confession should have been
163. Id. at 515-516.
164. Id.
165. Id. at 516; see infra note 188.
166. 597 F.2d at 516.
167. Id. at 516.
168. Id. at 517. The pertinent section of the conversation between the defendant
(Nash) and the government's attorney (Files) is as follows:
FILES: Please just tell us about it. Any time we are talking and you decide that you
need somebody else here, you just tell me about it and we will get somebody up here.
NASH: Well, I don't have the money to hire [an attorney], but I would like, you know,
to have one appointed.
FILES: You want one to be appointed for you?
NASH: Yes, sir.
FILES: Okay, I had hoped that we might talk about this, but if you want a lawyer
appointed, then we are going to have to stop right now.
NASH: But, uh, I kinda, you know, wanted, you know, to talk about it, you know, to
kinds, you know, try to get it straightened out.
FILES: Well, I can talk about it with you and I would like to, but if you want a lawyer,
well, I am going to have to hold off. I can't talk to you. It's your life.
NASH: I would like to have a lawyer, but I'd rather talk to you.
FILES: Well, what [the waiver form] says there is, it doesn't say that you don't ever
want to have a lawyer, it says that you don't want to have a lawyer here, now. You got the
right now, and I want you to know that. But if you want to have a lawyer here, well, I am
not going to talk to you about it.
NASH: No, I would rather talk to you.
FILES: You would rather talk to me? You do not want to have a lawyer here right
now?
NASH: No, sir.
FILES: Are you absolutely certain of that?
NASH: Yes, sir.
FILES: Go ahead and sign that thing.
Id. at 516-517.
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suppressed at trial because the defendant asked for an attorney to
be present during the questioning, thus mandating a cessation of
interrogation until the government provided an attorney to the de-
fendant." 9 The Fifth Circuit reversed, holding that the mere men-
tion of the word "lawyer" is not always an invocation of the right
to counsel.17 0 The court concluded that the defendant never in-
voked his right to counsel, but merely sought reassurance that he
would not waive his right to counsel at a future date by presently
discussing the circumstances of the murder with the assistant dis-
trict attorney. 7' In the immediate situation, the court found that
requiring the interrogation to cease after the defendant's initial re-
quest for a lawyer would have deprived the defendant of his "true
desire" to relate his story.172 The court, therefore, held that when
an accused expresses both a desire for counsel and a desire to con-
tinue the interview without counsel, police may clarify the pre-
ferred course that the accused seeks to follow.1
7 3
Three judges dissented from the majority opinion in Nash.
The dissent criticized the majority's permission of clarifying ques-
tions as creating too much uncertainty for police and prosecutors
and increasing the possibility of coercion by police officers to in-
duce the suspect to waive the right to counsel.174 Furthermore, the
169. Id. at 518.
170. Id. To hold otherwise, the court stated, would have required the government's
attorney to order the defendant "removed from his office without another word when 'law-
yer' fell from [the defendant's] lips." Id. See United States v. Jardina, 747 F.2d 945, 949
(5th Cir. 1984) (noting that the defendant's comment that he would be interested to know
what deal his attorney works out with the government did not invoke his right to counsel;
"[tihe word 'attorney' has no talismanic qualities"); see also United States v. McKinney,
758 F.2d 1036, 1044-45 (5th Cir. 1985) (holding that refusal to sign waiver of rights form is
not an invocation of right to counsel nor does it require limitation of questioning to clarifi-
cation of desire respecting counsel); Palmes v. Wainwright, 725 F.2d 1511, 1517 (11th Cir.)
(same), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 227 (1984); Gorel v. United States, 531 F.Supp. 368, 372
(S.D. Tex. 1981) (holding that the defendant's request of his wife to contact an attorney
constituted neither an indication of a present desire for counsel nor an equivocal request for
counsel).
171. 597 F.2d at 518. In holding that the defendant never invoked his right to counsel
during the interview, the court emphasized the sensitivity with which the government's at-
torney treated the defendant's rights. Approving of this sensitivity, the court observed that
the government's attorney repeatedly informed the defendant that he could cut off ques-
tioning during any point of the interview and consult an appointed lawyer. Id. at 519.
172. Id. at 519.
173. Id. at 517. The court, however, warned that the police should not aftempt to
"utilize the guise of clarification as a subterfuge for coercion or intimidation." Id. at 517-18.
See Daniel v. State, 644 P.2d 172, 177 (Wyo. 1982) (holding that interrogating officers "may
seek clarification of the suspect's desires, as long as he does not disguise the clarification as
a subterfuge for coercion or intimidation").
174. 597 F.2d at 526. The dissent feared that the majority opinion would encourage
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dissent criticized the majority's application of its own standard,
finding no equivocalness in the defendant's initial request for
counsel.'1 5 Finally, the dissent concluded that the statements
should not have been admitted in the absence of any government
proof of a knowing and intelligent waiver. 1 6
In Thompson v. Wainwright' 7 the Fifth Circuit reaffirmed its
Nash decision by holding that police may ask clarifying questions
following an accused's equivocal references to an attorney. The
court, however, qualified the Nash ruling by holding that police
must restrict further questioning to ascertaining whether the ac-
cused intends to invoke his right to counsel.1 ' In Thompson police
arrested the defendant for murder and then took the defendant
police "to find, even to create, equivocalness where there is none and in so doing force the
suspect constantly to reassert his right to counsel." Id. The dissent also feared that the
majority's rule would tempt the police to elicit equivocal statements from a suspect. Id.
175. The dissent stated:
What is, of course, wrong with [the district attorney's inquiry] at the threshold is that
[the defendant's] statements concerning his desire to continue without a lawyer were
the fruits of continued questioning by [the district attorney] after [the defendant] re-
quested counsel. The supposed need for clarification arose from interrogation contin-
ued after it was bound to cease. The opinion neither suggests nor even addresses any
justification for [the district attorney's] continuing the interrogation in the first in-
stance but employs the fruits of the continued questioning to find that [the defendant's
statement] was equivocal.
Id. at 523 (Godbold, J., dissenting) (emphasis deleted). The Supreme Court in 1984, prohib-
ited the use of later ambiguous statements to challenge a defendant's initial unequivocal
request for counsel. Smith v. Illinois, 469 U.S. 91 (1984). See supra notes 71-75 and accom-
panying text. The dissent also found that the interrogating officer had not limited his ques-
tioning to clarifying the accused's request for counsel, but had exerted subtle pressures on
the defendant to encourage him to waive the right to counsel. 597 F.2d at 524-25.
176. 597 F.2d. at 527.
177. 601 F.2d 768 (5th Cir. 1979)
178. Id. at 771. The court noted that when a defendant makes an equivocal request for
counsel, "[flurther questioning thereafter must be limited to clarifying that request until it
is clarified .... [Once] clarified as a present desire for the assistance of legal counsel, all
interrogation must cease until that is provided, just as in the case of an initial, unambiguous
request for an attorney." Id. (emphasis original). See also United States v. Cherry, 733 F.2d
1124 (5th Cir. 1984) (noting that police should have limited interrogation to clarifying the
defendant's desires regarding counsel after the defendant stated, "Maybe I should talk to an
attorney before I make a further statement," followed a few minutes later by, "Why should
I not get an attorney?"); United States v. Prestigiacomo, 504 F.Supp. 681, 683-84 (E.D.N.Y.
1981) (although allowing clarification following an equivocal request for counsel, court found
further police questioning did not comprise an effort to clarify the suspect's statement,
"maybe it would be good to have a lawyer"); Connecticut v. Barrett, 197 Conn. 50, 495 A.2d
1044 (1985) (holding that after the suspect stated that he would not give a written state-
ment without an attorney but would answer questions orally, police failed to limit question-
ing to clarification of the suspect's wishes), cert. granted, 54 U.S.L.W. 3761 (May 19, 1986);
State v. Cody, 293 N.W.2d 440, 446 (S.D. 1980) (finding that further police questioning after
the suspect's equivocal reference was not limited to clarification)..
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into an interview room for questioning.17 9 After the officers advised
the defendant of his rights, the defendant signed a waiver card. 80
The defendant then announced his desire to make a statement, but
only after consulting with an attorney.' An officer responded that
an attorney would counsel him not to say anything and, therefore,
the police would be unable to obtain the defendant's side of the
story.182 The defendant then gave a written confession.
e3
In reversing the district court's denial of a habeas corpus peti-
tion,1 94 the Fifth Circuit held that the interrogating officers vio-
lated the per se rule, established in Miranda,56 that requires a ces-
sation of all custodial interrogation once the accused requests an
attorney.86 The Fifth Circuit compared the fact situation
179. 601 F.2d. at 769.
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. Id. The record discloses the following exchange between the defendant's trial at-
torney and the interrogating officer:
Q: Did he at any time request that the interview cease?
A: No, sir. The only thing he said was he would like to tell his attorney first and we
told him he could tell us just as well and that his attorney would not be able to tell us what
he said so he wanted to tell us himself.
Q: Officer Cunningham, you indicated just a few seconds ago something about Mr.
Thompson wanted to tell his attorney first?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: He indicated that to you?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: An then what did you tell him?
A: I advised him if he told you that he would not be able to tell us what happened.
Q: And then he went ahead and told you?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: But he did ask for an attorney? He wanted to tell an attorney first?
A: Yes, sir, and we advised him if he told an attorney first he would not be able to talk
to us and tell us his side of the story.
Id. at 769-70.
183. Id. The defendant's attorney sought to suppress his client's confession at a pre-
trial hearing and during the trial. Id. at 770. The state trial court denied both motions to
suppress. The state court held that the defendant had understood fully the Miranda rights
and voluntarily had waived them. Id. The state trial court noted that the defendant signed a
waiver of rights card, demonstrated an understanding of his rights to the interrogating of-
ficers, and testified at the suppression hearing that he understood his rights at the time of
the interrogation. After the Florida Supreme Court affirmed the conviction, see Thompson
v. State, 328 So.2d 1 (Fla. 1976), the defendant sought a writ of habeas corpus in federal
district court. The district judge also concluded that the defendant voluntarily and intelli-
gently had waived his Miranda rights. 601 F.2d at 770.
184. See supra note 203 and accompanying text.
185. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 474 (1966); See Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S.
96, 109 (1975) (White, J., concurring) (stating that "[i]f the individual states that he wants
an attorney, the interrogation must cease until an attorney is present").
186. 601 F.2d at 770-71.
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presented in Thompson to that presented in Nash 187 and noted
that the difference between the two cases existed in the responses
interrogating officers made after the defendants expressed equivo-
cal requests for attorneys. The interrogating officers in Thompson,
unlike the officers in Nash, failed to limit their questioning to clar-
ifying the defendant's request.18 8 The court found that the interro-
gating officers in Thompson violated the defendant's Miranda
rights by seeking to dissuade the defendant from consulting with
an attorney, rather than limiting their questioning to clarifying the
defendant's equivocal request for an attorney.189 The court empha-
sized that the purpose of clarification was to discern whether the
accused desired an attorney, not to deter him from seeking one. 90
Thompson and Nash reflect the Fifth Circuit's view that the
word "attorney" does not assume "talismanic qualities" every time
the accused speaks the word. When the defendant makes an am-
biguous reference to an attorney, however, clarifying the defend-
ant's request protects the defendant's right to counsel by deter-
mining the defendant's desires.' 9' Thus, the Fifth Circuit has
established the rule that once an accused makes an ambiguous ref-
erence to counsel, interrogating officers must immediately limit
further questioning to clarifying the accused's desires. If and when
the interrogators clarify the reference as a present desire for legal
counsel, all interrogation must cease until the government provides
the accused with the opportunity to confer with counsel. Any
statements taken after the interrogators determine that the de-
fendant's reference to an attorney is a request for counsel violate
the Miranda requirements.
187. Id. at 771. See supra notes 159-68 and accompanying text.
188. 601 F.2d at 770.
189. Id. at 771-72. To make explicit what was implicit in Nash, the court stated:
[T]he limited inquiry permissible after an equivocal request for legal counsel may not
take the form of an argument between interrogators and suspect about whether having
counsel would be in the suspect's best interests or not. Nor may it incorporate a pre-
sumption by the interrogator to tell the suspect what counsel's advice to him would be
if he were present.
Id. at 772.
190. Id. The court noted that the officer's explanation of the probable consequences of
the defendant's proposed conference with counsel might have been harmless had the expla-
nation been correct. The conviction, however, required reversal because the officer gave an
incorrect explanation. The court observed that the interrogating officers persuaded the de-
fendant to waive the right to counsel by stating that "if he told his attorney he could not
tell his side of the story." Id.
191. Id.
192. Id. Several courts have specifically adopted the reasoning set forth in Nash and
Thompson. See, e.g., Gorel v. United States, 531 F. Supp. 368 (S.D. Tex.) rev'd on other
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IV. ANALYSIS
Courts that have considered whether an accused's equivocal
reference to an attorney constitutes an invocation of the right to
counsel have taken three different positions. The first view states
that ambiguous references to counsel do not constitute invocations:
references to an attorney must meet a threshold standard of clarity
to be deemed a request for counsel. The second view maintains the
opposite stance and considers any equivocal reference to an attor-
ney to be an invocation of the right of counsel. Under this ap-
proach, all interrogation must cease until the suspect has an op-
portunity to confer with counsel and have that counsel present
during all further questioning. The third view, adopting a middle
position, treats an ambiguous reference to an attorney as a possible
invocation of the right to counsel. The interrogating officers may
clarify whether the accused's statement was an attempt to invoke
the right to counsel. The Supreme Court needs to properly resolve
these conflicting approaches because the approach adopted will de-
termine, in part, the degree of protection afforded to the accused
during custodial interrogation. To determine the proper resolution,
the three positions must be evaluated in light of three considera-
tions: (1) judicial precedent, (2) everyday application of custodial
interrogation procedures, and (3) the need for stringent protection
of every individual's constitutional rights.
A. Judicial Precedent
The "in any manner" language1 93 of Miranda indicates that no
magical words are necessary for an accused to invoke his right to
an attorney. The Miranda court placed great emphasis on the pro-
tections that the government should afford each individual's right
to counsel during custodial interrogation.1 9 4 Thus, any proposed
standard must accommodate the variety of statements and con-
duct by which an accused may attempt to exercise an actual desire
to consult with an attorney. Requiring a formal request for counsel
grounds 659 F.2d 1073 (5th Cir. 1981); State v. Acquin, 187 Conn. 647, 448 A.2d 163 (1982)
cert. denied 463 U.S. 1229 (1983); Waterhouse v. State, 429 So.2d 301 (Fla. 1983); State v.
Moulds, 105 Idaho 880, 673 P.2d. 1074 (1983); State v. Robtoy, 98 Wash. 2d 101, 653 P.2d
284 (1982); United States v. Prestigiacomo, 504 F.Supp. 681 (E.D.N.Y. 1981); State v. Bar-
rett, 197 Conn. 50, 495 A.2d 1044 (1985), cert. granted, 54 U.S.L.W. 3761 (May 19, 1986);
Daniel v. State, 644 P.2d 172 (Wyo. 1982); Giacomazzi v. State, 633 P.2d 218 (Alaska 1982);
Mallott v. State, 608 P.2d 737 (Alaska 1980); State v. Cody, 293 N.W.2d 440 (S.D. 1980).
193. See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
194. See generally 384 U.S. at 469-75.
1986] 1187
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
would favor those defendants whose sophistication or prior experi-
ence with the law enables them to evade a trap that would prove
unavoidable to the inexperienced or unsophisticated.19 5
The threshold of clarity standard does not provide an accused
with the protection mandated by Miranda's "in any manner" lan-
guage. Requiring an accused to meet a threshold standard of clar-
ity may deny protection to the inarticulate, who fail to state clearly
a desire for counsel; to the nervous, who cannot maintain sufficient
composure to determine what is in their best interests or to ensure
that police are truly receptive to their desires; and to the inhibited,
who out of fear or ignorance fail to press their desire for counsel
strongly enough. Any of these denials of protection, if not in direct
violation of Miranda's "in any manner" language, would be con-
trary to the prophylactic intent of Miranda.'
The second approach, requiring a cessation of interrogation
upon any equivocal "request" for an attorney, best ensures that
Miranda's "in any manner" language is given the broadest inter-
pretation. This approach protects the accused's rights by constru-
ing any equivocal statement or conduct by the accused that could
be conceived, in any possible manner, as a desire for counsel to be
a request for counsel. This approach, like the third approach, par-
allels Miranda by creating a per se rule. The second and third
standards use objective criteria to determine whether a court
should exclude the evidence automatically. 197 The Miranda Court
believed that only objective safeguards could protect an accused's
rights during custodial interrogation. 98 The primary difficulty with
the second approach, however, is that the police must treat any
ambiguous reference as an invocation, even if the accused did not
mean to invoke his right to counsel. Thus, to avoid possible sup-
pression of evidence, interrogating officers must immediately halt
their questioning if the accused makes any reference to counsel,
unless the officers are able to establish that the accused subse-
quently made a knowing and intelligent waiver.199 This result is
195. See id. at 471. (noting that "[t]o require the request [for counsel to be unambigu-
ous] would be to favor the defendant whose sophistication or status had fortuitously
prompted him to make it.") (quoting People v. Dorado, 62 Cal. 2d 338, 351, 398, P.2d 361,
369-70, 42 Cal. Rptr. 169, 177-78 (1965)); see also People v. Duran, 140 Cal. App. 3d 485,
189 Cal. Rptr. 595, cert. denied 464 U.S. 991 (1983).
196. See supra note 164.
197. 384 U.S. at 457-63.
198. Id. at 478-79.
199. See supra notes 46-57 and accompanying text.
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also contrary to the intent of Miranda." '°
The third approach, which allows clarifying questions follow-
ing an accused's equivocal reference to counsel, best realizes Mi-
randa's intent. By treating an ambiguous reference as merely a
possible invocation until clarified, this approach protects only the
true desires for counsel that Miranda sought to safeguard. This
approach also creates an objective rule that would provide police
with guidance in interrogating suspects: once an accused makes an
equivocal reference to counsel, questioning must immediately focus
on whether the accused intends to invoke the right to counsel.
Arguably, this approach actually is subjective and places too
much discretion in the hands of the interrogating officers to inter-
pret whether a suspect's request for counsel was equivocal and,
thus, to determine whether subsequent questioning is permitted.
Furthermore, this approach arguably encourages police to continue
questioning of an accused in hopes of eliciting an equivocal state-
ment or confession after an accused unambiguously has invoked
the right to counsel.2 01 The Supreme Court, however, has held that
if a court finds the initial request for counsel was unambiguous,
any subsequent statements or responses would not be admissible,
absent the government's showing of waiver2 02 This ruling guards
against the possibility that police will attempt to characterize une-
quivocal invocations as equivocal and protects those defendants
who make clear requests for counsel by suppressing any subse-
quent responses. In addition, the Thompson v. Wainwright ruling
protects those defendants who make equivocal references to coun-
sel, but later allow police to dissuade or intimidate them from
maintaining the right to counsel. 203
200. See 384 U.S. at 478. The court stated:
Confessions remain a proper element in law enforcement. Any statement given freely
and voluntarily without any compelling influences is, of course, admissible in evidence.
... There is no requirement that police stop a person who enters a police station and
states that he wishes to confess to a crime, or a person who calls the police to offer a
confession or any other statement he desires to make.
Id. (footnote omitted); see also supra notes 215, 238, and accompanying text.
201. See Nash v. Estelle, 597 F.2d 513-523 (5th Cir.) (Godbold, J., dissenting), cert.
denied, 444 U.S. 981 (1979). See also supra notes 194-196 and accompanying text.
202. Smith v. illinois, 469 U.S. 91 (1984). See supra notes 91-95 and accompanying
text.
203. 601 F.2d 768 (5th Cir. 1979).
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B. Practical Law Enforcement Considerations
A second consideration in analyzing these competing stan-
dards is the impact each standard may have on the normal opera-
tions of police interrogation. The proper approach should provide
police with clear guidelines and not unduly hamper legitimate
criminal investigations. The threshold of clarity standard fails to
accomplish these goals. Under the threshold of clarity approach,
police may disregard an accused's reference to counsel if the inter-
rogating officers find the reference too ambiguous to discern the
accused's wishes. Unscrupulous officers may decide that a particu-
lar reference is ambiguous enough to convince a court that they
were unaware that the accused desired an attorney even though
they did realize that the accused wished to consult with an attor-
ney.20 4 This approach also leaves conscientious police wondering
when an equivocal reference has met the minimum standard. In
some instances, the approach may tempt police to raise the stan-
dard to avoid having the interrogation cease.
The second approach, which requires cessation of an interro-
gation upon any reference to counsel, provides police with a
"bright line rule. ' 20 5 In an area riddled with uncertainty and
fraught with the consequences of suppressed evidence, any ap-
proach that provides an objective rule is attractive. The second ap-
proach, however, unduly restricts legitimate criminal investigations
by requiring questioning to halt upon any equivocal reference to
counsel, even if the accused does not wish to invoke his right to
counsel. This approach, therefore, may inadvertently frustrate
both legitimate police investigations and the actual desire of the
accused to continue the interrogation without the aid of counsel.
The third approach, which allows police to ask clarifying ques-
tions after an accused makes an equivocal reference to counsel, sat-
isfies law enforcement concerns. The approach provides clear
guidelines for interrogating officers. When an accused makes an
equivocal reference to counsel, the interrogating officer must im-
mediately limit further questioning to clarifying the accused's
wishes regarding counsel. At the same time, this approach does not
unduly burden legitimate criminal investigations. The approach
mandates a cessation of interrogation only after the accused's re-
204. See People v. Kendricks, 121 Ill. App. 3d 442, 459 N.E.2d 1137 (1984); supra
notes 125-129 and accompanying text.
205. See New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 662 n.4 (1984) (O'Connor, J., dissenting
in part).
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sponses to clarifying questions reveal that the accused wishes to
consult with an attorney. The approach allows police to continue
their interrogation if the accused voluntarily expresses a desire to
continue the interrogation without the aid of counsel.
C. Individual Rights Concerns
The final factor in analyzing the various approaches is the
need for stringent protection of an accused's right against self-in-
crimination. Of all the considerations discussed, this requirement
is the most important in determining the proper approach to be
taken in resolving the issue. The optimal approach should ensure
that an accused is afforded the right to counsel during interroga-
tion whenever the accused so desires. Giving an accused the oppor-
tunity to confer with counsel best ensures that the accused's right
against self-incrimination will be protected.
The threshold of clarity standard fails to ensure adequately an
accused's right to counsel for several reasons. 06 Foremost among
these reasons is that equivocal references through which the ac-
cused truly wishes to invoke his right to counsel may not meet the
threshold. By failing to set forth any clear guidelines concerning
when an equivocal reference will constitute an invocation, courts
adopting this approach violate the spirit of Miranda. This ap-
proach lessens the protections inherent in Miranda's "in any man-
ner" language and fails to provide objective criteria to determine
whether evidence is admissible. In addition, courts may develop
differing threshold standards for each application of the approach
and add more confusion and uncertainty to an already ambiguous
area.
The second approach protects an accused's right to counsel,
but is too strict in its application and consequences. By requiring
an immediate halt to all questioning upon any reference to an at-
torney, this approach places the state in a paternalistic relation-
ship with the accused. Under this approach, the state effectively
invokes the right to counsel for the accused upon any reference to
an attorney, regardless of whether the accused actually wishes to
invoke the right to counsel. Although police should clearly inform
an accused of his right to have counsel present during interroga-
tion, the accused should make the decision whether to waive or to
invoke that right. This absolutist approach can become a pretext
that detracts from the deference that interrogators and courts
206. See supra text accompanying notes 196-204.
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should accord to an accused's decision. By interjecting an attorney
after any reference to counsel, the state forces a decision on the
accused that the accused has not necessarily reached or may not
desire.
The third approach provides constitutionally adequate safe-
guards to an accused's right to counsel and ensures that the deci-
sion whether to invoke the right to counsel rests with the accused.
This approach rejects the notion that the state should thrust an
attorney upon an accused without first ascertaining the accused's
true desire. Through clarification, law enforcement officials can de-
termine the actual desire of the accused. By focusing on the desire
of the accused, this procedure provides the time needed for the
accused to make a decision and helps to emphasize the importance
that interrogators and the accused should attach to the decision.
Furthermore, this approach excludes evidence that police obtain
through their failure, either in bad faith or by inadvertance, to dis-
cern and honor possible invocations of an accused's right to
counsel.
The United States Supreme Court recently has declined to re-
solve the conflict among the courts concerning whether an equivo-
cal reference to an attorney constitutes an invocation of the right
to counsel.01 Having decided that the government may not use
statements that an accused makes after an unequivocal request for
counsel to cast doubt on the original invocation, 0° the Court must
soon face the need to resolve the conflicting approaches discussed
in this Note.2 0 9 The Court should adopt the third approach, which
treats an equivocal reference to an attorney as a possible invoca-
tion of the right to counsel until the government clarifies that ref-
erence. Once police have clarified the reference as a desire for
counsel, all interrogation should immediately cease until the police
have afforded the accused an opportunity to confer with counsel.
In adopting this approach, the Court will recognize that every
mention of the word "lawyer" does not trigger the need for clarifi-
cation. Only those references which raise some inference, no matter
how small, that the accused desires an attorney should cause an
immediate narrowing of questioning to clarify the accused's wishes.
207. Smith v. Illinois, 469 U.S. 91 (1984); see supra notes 14-16, 91-95 and accompany-
ing text.
208. 469 U.S. 91, 96 (1984).
209. See Connecticut v. Barrett, 197 Conn. 50, 495 A.2d 1044, cert. granted, 54
U.S.L.W. 3761 (May 19, 1986). The Barrett case may give the court the opportunity to
resolve this conflict.
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Requiring clarifying questions after any utterance of the word
"lawyer" potentially creates nonsensical situations in which officers
are required to badger the accused with technical questions when
the accused obviously has no desire to consult with an attorney. By
adopting an approach that limits questioning to clarification upon
any reference to an attorney that police conceivably could consider
as an expression of some desire for an attorney, the Supreme Court
would provide lower courts with an objective standard to deter-
mine the admissibility of incriminating statements, interrogating
officers with simple and clear procedures to follow, and, most im-
portantly, individuals with strict, yet sensible, protection of their
constitutional right against self-incrimination.
V. CONCLUSION
Courts have adopted three approaches to determining whether
an accused's ambiguous reference to an attorney consitutes an in-
vocation of the right to counsel. The first approach requires that
an accused's reference to an attorney must meet a threshold stan-
dard of clarity before courts will consider the statement to be an
invocation of the right to counsel. The second approach states that
interrogation must cease whenever an accused alludes to counsel,
regardless of the ambiguity of his statement. The final approach
holds that when an accused has made an equivocal reference that
reasonably could be regarded as a request for counsel, the police
must immediately restrict their questioning to clarifying whether
the accused intends to invoke his right to counsel.
The lower courts' conflicting approaches reflect the difficulty
associated with developing the proper safeguards that courts
should apply to an accused's right against compelled self-incrimi-
nation. Resolution of the current conflict among courts will help
provide and maintain the proper balance between the preservation
of individual rights and law enforcement officials' important need
to pursue legitimate criminal investigations. This Note argues that
the proper resolution of what statements or conduct should consti-
tute an accused's invocation of the right to counsel stems from a
careful examination of the dictates of Miranda, the routine opera-
tion of criminal investigations, and the need for stringent protec-
tion of the right against compelled self-incrimination. This Note
concludes that a moderate approach, the application of which
seeks to clarify the accused's actual desire concerning counsel
whenever police can reasonably infer that desire from the accused's
conduct or statements, best serves Miranda's goals by providing
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interrogating officers with objective guidelines and by protecting
the accused's right against self-incrimination.
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